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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1818



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ROMANIAN AWARDS GIVEN TO WARSAW PACT, BULGARIAN MILITARY OFFICERS

Warsaw Pact Officers Awards

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 56, 8 Jul 80 pp 3-4

[Presidential Decree awarding the medal "Military Virtue" to generals, admirals and officers working in the organs of leadership of the United Armed Forces]

[Text] For contributions made in strengthening friendship among the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Sole article--The medal Military Virtue First Class is conferred on the following comrades:

From the Bulgarian People's Army--Maj Gen Eng Penyu Danev Khalkov; Col Georgi Petkov Kolev; Col Nedelcho Atanasov Smilyanov; Captain first class Velyo Todorov Peev.

From the Hungarian People's Army--Maj Gen Eng Janos Horvath; Col Istvan Kovacs; Col Pal Kocsis; Lt Col Eng Laszlo Kovacs.

From the People's National Army of the German Democratic Republic--Col Hans Jurgen Wolk; Lt Col Deiter Zeidel; Col Wolfgang Hasse; Lt Col Gerhard Gise.

From the Polish Army--Brig Gen Sergiusz Kalugin; Brig Gen Jerzy Lagoda; Col Maksymilian Koszeniewski; Col Zvigmunt Drzewiecki.

From the armed forces of the USSR--General of the Army Anatoliy Ivanovich Gribkov; Admiral Vladimir Vasilyevich Mikhaylin; Col Gen Eng Ivan Artemyevich Fabrikov; Lt Gen Anatoliy Grigoryevich Merezhko; Lt Gen Mikhail Georgiyevich Titov; Lt Gen Viktor Vasil'yevich Semenikov; Maj Gen Lyubim Kirillovich Fedorov; Maj Gen Dmitriy Petrovich Sarkashev; Air Force Maj Gen Vitaliy Mikhaylovich Bugayenko; Maj Gen Fedor Makarovich Sarichev; Col Vasiliy Mikhaylovich Galkov; Col Viktor Yakovlevich Cherniyak; Dmitriy Nikolayevich Sorikin; Col Viktor Georgiyevich

Fedosyev; Col Vladimir Vasil'yevich Medil'ko; Col Arkadiy Mikhaylovich Voribiyev; Col Vladislav Fedorovich Kovtunov; Lt Col Nikolay Alekseyevich Kostin; Col Yuriy Vasil'yevich Beleayev; Lt Maj Igor Ivanovich Dokudovskiy; Col Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Tomilin; Capt First Class Geliy Aleksandrovich Menshikov; Capt First Class Mikhail Petrovich Korcheagin; Capt Second Class Ivan Stepanovich Kovalenko; Col Eng Valeriy Stepanovich Mishkovskiy; Col Yevgeniy Nikitovich Nikolayev; Col Genadiy Aleksandrovich Andryukov; Col Eng Yuliy Semenovich Natarov; Col Boris Mikhaylovich Yablokov; Captain Vladimir Nikolayevich Maleyev.

From the Czechoslovak People's Army--Lt Gen Bohuslav Kucera; Lt Col Imre Jatko; Lt Col Jiri Gora; Col Milan Pipal.

Nicolae Ceausescu
President of the
Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 6 May 1980
No 100

Awards for Bulgarian Officers

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romania Part I No 56, 8 Jul 80 pp 4-5

[Presidential Decree awarding the medal "Military Virtue" to some generals and officers in the Bulgarian People's Army]

[Text] For contributions made to the strengthening of the friendship between the army of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Bulgarian People's Army, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Sole article--The medal, Military Virtue First Class, is conferred upon the following comrades: Col Gen Slavcho Stamenov Trenski; Col Gen Avgust Khristov Kabakchiev; Col Gen German Dimitrov Germanov; Lt Gen Petko Khristokoskov Dudof; Lt Gen Trifon Rangelov Balkanski; Lt Gen Tenyu Stoyanov Popov; Maj Gen Petko Milushev Petkov; Lt Gen Panayot Aleksandrov Karakachanov; Maj Gen Georgi Kostov Stoyanov; Lt Gen Geno Genov Stoykov; Lt Gen Khristo Ruskov Khristov; Maj Gen Strakhil Mladenov Stefanov; Maj Gen Vasil Stoychev Kosarov; Maj Gen Kuncho Pavlov Patev; Maj Gen Blagoy Petrov Zakhariev; Maj Gen Delcho Dobrev Delchev; Maj Gen Gocho Kostov Gochev; Maj Gen Prof Dr Dimitur Stoyanov Sishmanov; Maj Gen Prof Dr Ivan Viktorov Dimitrov; Maj Gen Prof Dr Stanko Stankov Petrov; Maj Gen Todor Dimitrov Donchev; Maj Gen Aleksandur Todorov Aleksandrov; Maj Gen Dimitur Petrov Popov; Maj Gen Grigor Borisov Zhotev; Col Petur Atanasov Iliev; Col Yanaki Markov Tenkov; Col Todor Petrov Stanev; Capt First Class Dragomir Stefanov Dudev; Col Petur Ivanov Petkov; Col Eng Stefan Stoyanov Mikhaylov; Col Eng Ivan Georgiev Dimov;

Col Stanoy Panayotov Stanoev; Col Kostadin Raykov Raykov; Col Sayko Nikolov Marinov; Col Ivan Petrov Berlevski; Col Eng Penyu Todorov Kostadinov; Col Mladen Nikolov Mladenov; Col Kiro Belchev Totev; Col Dencho Minev Georgiev; Col Nedko Yordanov Dimitrov; Col Zakhari Petrov Khristakov; Maj Gen Prof Dr Gencho Dimov Krustinov; Maj Gen Dicho Dimov Dichev; Col Ilya Stanev Madzharov; Col Kostadin Georgiev Katsarov; Col Yordan Ivanov Gumnerov.

Nicolae Ceausescu,
President of the
Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest 22 May 1980
No 120

CSO: 2700

BULGARIA

VISITING SPANISH POLITICIAN COMMENTS ON BULGARIAN ANNIVERSARY

Sofia ZENEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Comments by Prof Antonio Hernandez Gil, expressed to Ivan Glushkov in the offices of the newspaper, on the occasion of his visit to Bulgaria as Chairman of the Spanish National Committee on Bulgaria's 1,300th anniversary celebration]

[Text] This is my second trip to Bulgaria. I came here the first time as chief of a Spanish parliamentary delegation. Then and now I saw a people (and I was highly impressed) that is succeeding in molding together its pursuit of reform and progress with memories of and respect for its history. An appropriate proof of this is also the initiative to celebrate the 1,300th anniversary of the founding of Bulgaria. I consider this event exceptional, endowed with national and international significance, inasmuch as the contribution to its wide imprint by many other countries is concerned. Being familiar with the history of an ancient nation and having the possibility of exchanging spiritual values, is this not one of the most solid ways of consolidating friendship, of reaching the ideal that should unite humanity in its entirety, the ideal for lasting peace on our planet?

During my visit I had the honor and pleasure of meeting and having important conversations with Petur Tanchev, the secretary of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and first deputy chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, who was also instrumental in inviting me to this celebration. We both agreed that great possibilities exist for mutually advantageous cooperation in different fields between Spain and Bulgaria, whereby both countries will contribute to the creation of a climate of trust and understanding in Europe. Special attention was devoted to the role of the democratic parties and organizations in mobilizing public opinion on our continent to work in the name of peace and progress.

I was also received by Mrs Lyudmila Zhivkova, chairman of the Committee for Culture. We discussed three issues. The first one was the need to unite the efforts of all honest people in creating a world of peace where war will be nonexistent. We also talked about the children and the attention they

get in both our countries. I learned about the undertakings in Bulgaria connected with the International Year of the Child. I was also very highly impressed by the monument "The Banner of Peace" standing in the outskirts of Sofia. It expresses a unique and basic humanitarian idea as a concept and as an artistic creation as well.

No doubt that in the foreground of my conversation with Mrs Zhivkova was the celebration of the 1,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian nation and Spain's contribution to this celebration. I consider it a special honor and I am grateful that the responsibility of presiding on the Spanish committee for the celebration of this notable event was bestowed upon me. The committee consists of people of great authority and prestige in the fields of culture, science, and politics. We have already held several meetings and members of the committee are eager to assist actively in the fulfillment of this noble goal.

I would like to point out that our activity will contribute to the better understanding, and hence to the creation of favorable conditions for expanding the relationship between Spain and Bulgaria. The more so as there are very clearly defined similarities between the Spanish and Bulgarian people, in character, temperament, and spirit, in spite of geographic distance. In the course of centuries our two countries have experienced critical moments but have always been able to overcome them. And I think that the important thing now is the willpower of Spain and Bulgaria to continue on the road to further progress, cooperation, and peace in spite of the daily problems facing us. It is exactly this basic goal, the celebration of peace, that should unite all people of good will. We should strive for it in spite of differences in our sociopolitical systems and philosophical ideas and probably precisely because of that.

In conclusion, I would like to use the pages of this newspaper to express my warmest feelings toward Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people, to thank you most sincerely for your heart-warming hospitality and for the opportunity to see much interesting things and to familiarize myself on the spot with the past and present of your wonderful country.

1010

CSO: 2200

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR BETTER TRAINING OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

Sofia NARODNA ARKIYA in Bulgarian 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] The successful solution of the tasks concerning military training and further improvement of combat readiness of the aviation units in the light of party requirements and better flight safety depend greatly on the correct organization and skillful vectoring of the flights. The work of the air traffic controllers is intricate and responsible. With their alertness they keep strict order on land and in the air and react fast and correctly in difficult situations.

The air traffic controllers of the Air Force units are highly qualified and capable of achieving excellent results in fulfilling the tasks of the flight units. Officers Sinapov, Vladimirov, Todorov and many others skillfully direct flights by communicating carefully, calmly and professionally with the crew on land and in the air and constantly watching over the safety of the flights.

However, there are still some shortcomings in the training and work of some of the controllers' units where Officers Zlatkov, Slavov and some others are assigned. For example, before the start of a certain flight, Captain Totev had underestimated the difficult meteorological conditions in the area of the flights. And when he had taken his position in the air traffic control tower, due to his own overconfidence, he had not paid the necessary attention to the report of one of the young pilots. And this had caused a tense and dangerous situation during the flight. The navigating and vectoring officer of the air traffic control tower was also at fault for the complicated situation in the field.

This fact proves that in order to vector correctly one needs not only great experience, high qualifications and some special individual qualities, but also systematic and purposeful training of the entire personnel as well as exercising constant operational control. The basic requirements for this purpose are listed in the designated flight manuals. The experience of the leading units shows that only strict observance of the directive marked in these manuals guarantees perfect results in achieving high quality performance and safety in flights.

Receiving and analyzing the incoming information, the controller must consider not only the circumstances at that precise moment and the images on the screen, but also anticipate the subsequent situation. He must be able at any moment to separate the most pertinent information from the main stream of incoming positions and at the same time remember the prior information as well. The rapid change of circumstances, the different messages coming in from different relay channels, the immediate decisions and the great responsibility involved, increase the psychological tension of the traffic controller and the specialists working under him.

Many conditions have to be complied with so that the controllers can sequence the flights according to schedule. One of these conditions is to plan correctly the number of airplanes and helicopters that have to be directed simultaneously by the unit. Experience shows that errors may occur if more planes are in the air than the scheduled optimal number.

It is exceptionally important that during the preliminary training and actual practice at the air traffic control tower, together with the purely professional skills, the specialists and mainly the future controllers also show skill in analyzing and predicting flight conditions, in making quick decisions and handling a great volume of information at the same time.

The staff of the aviation section plays a very important role in the organization and directing of the flights. On the day of the preliminary training the section chief, through the staff officers and department chiefs and following the decision of the commander, personally makes the requests for the flight routes and the necessary means for directing the planes. He organizes the training and watches how the pilots use the equipments and simulators, supervises the studies of the controllers, collects data about the means and capacities of directing the flights and reports to the commander. The deputy commander of the political work plans and organizes the working political schedule together with the air traffic controllers in accordance with the tasks, character and peculiarities of the future flights. In the leading combat units the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists explain in depth the requirements of the flight manuals, summarize and publicize systematically the successful experiences of the air traffic controllers, guarantee the vanguard role of the communists and the excellence of the Komsomol members in mastering aviation technology as well as the means for the most effective ways of flight directing in different meteorological conditions. Directing air traffic is one of the most important links in the total system of operations which contributes to the improvement of flight safety.

Therefore the training of air traffic controllers and their mastering of all duties and obligations should always be the most important goal of the commanders, staff, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations.

FACTORS LIMITING NATO'S USE OF MILITARY POWER ANALYZED

East Berlin IPW-BERICHTe in German Vol 9 No 7, Jul 80 pp 10-17

[Article by Gerhard Basler: 'Military Power in the Anti-Detente Concept of Imperialism: Aggressive Forces Increase Reliance on Military Factor--Growing Contradiction Between Imperialist Goals and Limited Possibilities--Increased Rearmament Endangers Peace and Security']

[Text] The basic deterioration of general living conditions in present-day imperialism incites its ruling circles to feverishly search for means and methods for halting and even reversing it. Over and over again, and especially at the turn of the 1970/1980's, attention is dangerously focused on the use, the expansion and the deployment of the military power of imperialism.¹ Considerable forces in the West try to return to the methods of the cold war era, when imperialist policy was known for brinkmanship: They have initiated a new round of rearmament and use their armed forces not only as tools for political blackmail but for direct and armed conflict with the forces of progress. To a far greater extent than only a few years ago these forces--which have achieved influential positions in the United States and other imperialist countries--are endeavoring to carry out a "correction," a "change in the trend" of the general direction of the international balance of power, especially by calling on the various types of use of military power.

That is also the nature of the so-called Carter doctrine. According to Z. Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to the American President, it is necessary "to have the appropriate military power to help direct changes in a positive direction," which must be so constituted as to "be in keeping with our values and compatible with our interests."² His colleague Harold Brown, U.S. Defense Secretary, underlines this with the emphatic and unmistakable indication "that the efficacy of our foreign policy often depends on the military power backing it."³ The aggressive and misanthropic practices of imperialism in the past 30 years have amply proven that these are not mere words.

In accordance with its socioeconomic nature state monopolistic capitalism, an exploiter system, inevitably breeds aggression, including its military

manifestations, and war. However, whether, when and how the military power tool of imperialism is used, depends largely on the international balance of power and the politics of the ruling circles. The politics of strength have always been the basic principle of imperialist policy. Ulrich de Maistère, former Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, for example, considers that armed forces "provide political scope to governments."⁴

The compulsive expansion of the imperialist military potential is thus a central element in the effort of the ruling circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie to once again emerge from the historical defensive and gain the political offensive. This holds true most particularly at the present time, when the change in the international balance of power tilts it more and more obviously against imperialism. "The less imperialism's opportunities for ruling other countries and peoples, the more angrily do its most aggressive and short-sighted representatives react," commented L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, citing the main reason for imperialism's increasing penchant for military solutions.⁵

Consequently, in the early 1980's influential forces in the West, especially the United States, noticeably exacerbated the international situation by setting their sights on rearmament and demonstrations of military might, and against detente, thereby increasing the danger of war. Their actions are dictated by the fear that the further implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence might further narrow the foreign political scope enjoyed by imperialism for making its power and profit interests prevail. At the same time, and most notably so, they are motivated by the efforts of the military-industrial complex to use rearmament for obtaining long-term and reasonably sure maximum profits. Greater aggressiveness abroad is also designed to deflect attention from the many problems and weaknesses, the internal and external defeats of imperialism. In the first place, though, it is a matter of improving the status of imperialism in the conflict with the forces of the revolutionary world process.

Above all military power is to help imperialism to pressure the socialist countries from a position of strength. At the same time it is intended to raise substantial barriers to the economic and social development of socialism by compelling it increasingly to raise defense expenditure. At the same time military power is to serve as a potential threat not only in the struggle against socialism but also in the conflict with the other main streams of the revolutionary world process. The young national states are to be kept in subjection, revolutionary-democratic changes in the imperialist countries stifled either by armed force or the threat thereof, raw material and energy sources as well as the exploitation of the developing countries secured in all circumstances.

Imperialism uses military force in two main ways: As immediate and direct force, involving the open use of weapons (war, intervention), and as indirect, hidden and potential force threatening the use of weapons (troop displacements, provocative maneuvers, mobilization, "deterrence," violation of

air space, naval concentrations, and so on). Just let us consider the irresponsible manner, totally disregarding the peaceful interests of mankind, by which U.S. imperialism has used such methods in the recent past-- from the aggression against Vietnam to the adventurist use of military forces against Iran. There cannot be the least doubt that any reinforcement of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the military potential for the aggressive aims of imperialism must precipitate the utmost danger. Nevertheless imperialism is meeting objective limits which restrain the use of its military power and, above all, prevent the eruption of another world war. The peace policy and real power of socialism, especially the USSR and the other countries in the Warsaw Pact organization, provide the main barrier to war and military compulsion. They have the greatest role in changing the international balance of power to the detriment of imperialism. Regarding the use of military power General Maxwell D. Taylor, former chief of the U.S. Defense Staff, regrets that "we no longer have the political scope available to us in the calm days of our postwar preeminence...Times have changed...We are no longer...able to use and maintain military power everywhere we would like."⁶

The decisive obstacle to the use of military force by imperialism is the relative military balance between the USSR and the United States as well as between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This is the situation which, in view of the risk of self-annihilation in a nuclear inferno, deters the imperialist party from the use of its military arsenal against the Warsaw Pact countries, although bourgeois strategists would make us believe that this hesitation is due to the weapons development consequent upon the scientific-technological revolution in military matters.

Other factors counteracting the use or the threat of the use of military force by imperialism are the noticeably greater weight of the developing countries, their newly achieved status vis-a-vis imperialism and the support given them by world socialism (which, somehow, also acts as a protective shield against imperialist intervention). And not least the peoples' struggle for peace in its own sphere of influence (as demonstrated in the successful resistance to the introduction of the neutron bomb) limits the potential of imperialism for endlessly raising and using military power.

In recent years especially some obstacles to the use of military means have come to the fore. They resulted in part from the fact that imperialism is increasingly confronted with economic, political and social problems which cannot be appropriately--if at all--handled by military means, while economic means are definitely suitable. In other words factors other than military strength are gaining greater importance for maintaining the interests of the imperialist countries.

The scope of the imperialist system in this respect is also narrowed by certain disagreements between imperialist countries and regions or among the various groups of the bourgeoisie within a country regarding the suitability, usefulness and dimensions of the use of military force in any specific instance.

Modified Views on the Use of Military Power

The situation of the state monopolistic system is characterized by the objective contradiction between the ambitious targets of imperialism "supported" by a steadily expanded and enormous military potential and the limited possibilities for really using this military might to influence the course of the historical development in the international arena. This contradiction is the expression of as well as an element in the general crisis of imperialist foreign policy. Not that this signifies the renunciation of the use of military power, but it does imply the necessity to operate in a narrower framework and with modified means and methods. Of course the powers of imperialism also acknowledge this discrepancy between potential and possibilities, and they attempt to come to terms with it. The acknowledgment of changes they have been compelled to accept has led them to seek new ways to improve the effectiveness of force as a means of imperialist foreign policy. British political scientist Laurence Martin expressed this endeavor when he wrote that the future does not belong to those "who deny usefulness to military power but to those who manage best to adjust it to the rapid development of politics and technology."⁸

When we more closely scrutinize the most important conclusions drawn by imperialist strategists and politicians from the contradiction between goals, potentials and possibilities of the use of military power, and which enter their foreign political and defense conceptions, we are bound to notice in this sphere also the endeavor to adjust politics and strategy to the changed conditions for the continued existence of the state monopolistic system. The tools of military power are to be made more flexible, appropriate and efficient. On the other hand we see here a clear albeit highly complex process of differentiation within the bourgeoisie regarding the best approaches and methods for using this power in these changed conditions. Here, though, I am able only to outline the main trends of this process.

The first conclusion emphatically impressed on the imperialist party (with merely a few exceptions) since the loss of U.S. nuclear superiority consists in the existential necessity of avoiding a "central" war between the United States and the USSR or between the two alliances. Even imperialist strategists admit that, "in a nuclear age" such a war would "signify the actual total destruction of our own society."⁹ In the course of various treaties concluded with the USSR in the 1970's the United States had been compelled to formally acknowledge this fact. A total nuclear missile war is not, so to speak, considered a "rational method," although some particularly aggressive forces do think it justified in "an extreme emergency." Let us recall the words of Z. Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to the U.S. President, who said he would not hesitate in the appropriate instance to push the button to unleash the nuclear inferno. As we all know the material preparations for this contingency are steadily going ahead at full speed.

A second, fundamental and preeminent conclusion by all imperialist forces concerns the attempt to make military power feasible even more than hitherto as a means to exert political pressure, that is in an indirect manner, just because its direct use has quite definite limits. The purpose of the political use of military power is frankly expressed by the representatives of the bourgeoisie: It is said that armed force "may be useful even if not actively employed, that is used violently. Restrained arms availability acts as a threat or a warning...Military power impresses the nations which see it...It impresses and effects adjustment or, to put it in another way, produces voluntary good behavior in the meaning of the demands of the superior power."¹⁰ Such methods are part of the daily arsenal of imperialism. By its own admission the United States used armed power "passively" (!) 215 times for political purposes in the years 1946-1975, 33 times on the brink of the use of nuclear weapons.¹¹

Combination With Non-Military Means

Linked to this is a third conclusion. This concerns orientation to an even closer link between military and non-military forms and methods of the international class conflict. When evaluating his system of alliances V.I. Lenin pointed out that imperialist policy always consists of a "change in the forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle on one and the same soil of imperialist connections and interrelations between world economics and world politics."¹²

All significant forces of the bourgeoisie and its political and political representatives assume the need for "combining military force, political efforts and economic programs" as a "counterweight"¹³ to the challenges posed to imperialism by historical progress. In the final analysis this is merely the reflection of the general endeavor of the ruling circles of imperialism--aroused by the changes in the international balance of power--to regain the historical offensive by using the totality of means and potentials.

No sections of monopoly capital or its politicians and ideologues dispute the doctrine that, as a matter of principle, military power continues the "foundation stone" of the politics of imperialism.¹⁴ The issue of the specific relation of military and non-military means of foreign political strategy (that is the specific accents) does, though, constitute the most disputed point among the various groups of the bourgeoisie. (We must note, however, that this is reflected mainly in the political-conceptual sphere, much less in political practice, and that, moreover, the line is neither rigid nor unchangeable but rather fluid.) While a section of the ruling class assigns priority to the military factor in its direct and indirect use, another pleads for a balanced relation, and a third prefers non-military means without, however, eschewing military means altogether.

It all turns on the crucial issue of what will best serve imperialism in the eyes of the ruling circles in any given situation, whether short-term or long-term, so as to influence the international system, a particular country or a situation; what is "feasible" in view of specific realities. In short, involved is the usefulness of the deployment of military power. A second source of differences within the bourgeoisie (and it is one which poses the question of the relation between military and non-military means generally rather than usefulness in this or that instance) arises from a difference in priorities: If only for material-financial reasons, the group considering the economic internal and sociopolitical consolidation of capitalism the most important issue in the dispute between the systems, is less interested in demonstrations of military power. However, this group is currently very much in the minority; well to the fore are the champions of a more or less strongly emphasized policy of military strength.

A few of the bourgeois politologists are quite realistic. In view of the limits of military power they arrive at yet another conclusion. They wish to assign predominance to political means for safeguarding "security," that is measures of military and political detente, in order--as FRG political scientist E. Porndran hopes--"possibly from a long-term aspect" to shift "the various political elements of a general security concept toward non-military security."¹⁵

Speculations on the 'Feasibility' of Wars

A fourth deliberation by imperialist strategists led to the concept of a selective approach to the use of military power. Politicians "should not embark on the frequent or hasty use of military power...abroad; such forces should be deployed only in special cases," advise the authors of a paper by the influential American Brookings Institution.¹⁶ Any decision to threaten or use force should reflect regional, factual (the so-called vital interests) and military considerations. Relevant criteria were drawn up in the United States with the aim, for example, of ascertaining where and how to use the still available scope for the use of military power (especially in its direct forms) without calling forth developments and entanglements undesirable for imperialism, let alone new defeats.

Quite cynically they assume that "war per se has not become useless," and that the destructive force of military power could well be used to settle political conflicts.¹⁷ Of course the imperialist strategists are well aware that, in view of the international--especially military--balance of powers, this would be an "exception," but they are all the more intent on exploring the remaining possibilities of such exceptions and tackling the corresponding conceptual and material preparations. To a large extent these deliberations are dominated by new weapons developments, especially those based on advances in electronics (accuracy, regulation of effect, controllability), which either result in new military-strategic conclusions or are specifically planned and introduced from new military-strategic standpoints. Christoph Bertram, director of the London International

Institute for Strategic Studies, well described the nature as well as the purpose of such developments: "The characteristic of the new weapons...is the advantage of their use in the nuclear-strategic as well as the conventional sphere," the new technology, he says, offers advantages mainly for a surprise attack (!).¹⁸

In the final analysis the many and various military-strategic conceptions drafted while taking into account constantly new individual aspects are always different variants of a war which is regional or "limited" (as far as weaponry is concerned). The range of war variants is thereby to be expanded with the smallest possible risk for those which start it, while they maintain "control" of the possibility of escalation to general nuclear warfare and the variants remain as effective as possible. Let me indicate here only one of the many such variants--the endeavor to convert nuclear warfare also into an effective tool of foreign and military policy by opening up options and stages.

According to a bourgeois expert in the United States, "an increasing acceptance of the concept of nuclear war" is to be found "among American strategists." "Once again strategists are thinking the unthinkable--they debate the circumstances in which they would begin and dare undertake nuclear warfare."¹⁹

Nor are we faced merely with a theoretical discussion: NATO, according to a Pentagon adviser, has already taken steps toward providing for itself the appropriate capacity.²⁰

The "limited strategic war" doctrine is one of the constructs within the "low risk" nuclear war concept. According to American notions it envisions a first and surprise nuclear strike, aimed especially at particularly important military rather than civilian or economic targets. The speculation runs that this would decisively weaken the military power of the opponent (in other words the USSR), while "generously" leaving him some chance for survival. At the same time it is hoped that, in the aftermath of such a first strike, the opponent would not unleash all counteroffensive weapons but aim for only limited targets.

This clearly demonstrates several points: The striving for a "first strike capacity" and, therefore, greater emphasis on the arms race; the adventurism of the illusions harbored by imperialism as regards its--hoped for--superiority on the one hand and the corresponding weakness of the "opponent" on the other; and, lastly, the unscrupulous misanthropy and danger of this concept. A well-known American defense expert could not help but confess that there are critics in the U.S. camp "who argue that more useable nuclear power represents a potential which makes its deployment more likely."²¹ At the same time politicians and military men consciously toy with the risk inherent in this increasing probability. U.S. Defense Secretary Brown (under whose direction intensive work is being done to provide the material-technical prerequisites for this strategy) made this quite

plain by cynically admitting: "It is impossible to be certain that the initial use of nuclear weapons against specific targets--however selected--may not result in escalation up to the exchange of unlimited nuclear blows."²²

Strenuous Expansion of the Imperialist Military Potential

In the early 1980's imperialism represents itself as the system pressing forward with rearmament and the development of the armed forces in unprecedented qualitative and quantitative dimensions, at a significantly greater speed, and in a comprehensive and worldwide manner. This is to provide the prerequisites for even better, more effectively and, above all, more emphatically using military power in its two main forms as an instrument of imperialist strategy.

The most prominent feature of the endeavors to strengthen and improve defense materiel is the effort reflected in matters of policy and defense to regain military superiority over socialism. It is the attempt to reverse the existing approximate military balance between socialism and imperialism in favor of the latter.

U.S. Defense Secretary Brown made this abundantly clear on 19 September 1979 when, addressing the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he announced that the NATO conventional rearmament programs already tackled meant "that the alliance...might achieve a definite advantage by about the mid-1980's" and would then dispose of a potential sufficient to "more than balance" the efforts of the Warsaw Pact.²³

Many rearmament programs serve the striving for military superiority in the strategic as well as the regional sphere. Strategic superiority is envisioned, for example, by the build-up of a "first strike capacity" using the latest discoveries of science and technology and the emplacement of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Regional superiority is to be achieved by, among others, improved conventional weapons, greater mobility and the modernization of the tactical nuclear weapons arsenal.

All this is justified with the lie--deliberately and more and more shamelessly formulated--of a military threat to the West from the socialist community of nations, especially the Soviet Union. The open claim to U.S. military superiority has changed an important element in imperialist strategy. In the early 1970's we were able to note an at least verbal readiness (in the United States also) to realize a compromise between the various wings of the bourgeoisie on the basis of a certain enforced acceptance of the concept of strategic parity and the principle of equal security.²⁴ The profession of the principle of equal security was indeed the basis of a certain enforced acceptance of any prospect for the success of the efforts for arms limitation. We must therefore take very seriously indeed the remarks by representatives of imperialism, which actually deny these positions.

Four main aspects characterize imperialist rearmament efforts: To be cited first is their quantitatively new dimension and dynamism. NATO wasted some \$2.6 quintillions on arms in its 30 years of existence. In 1979 it officially announced a \$211.5 billion arms expenditure; through 1985 the United States alone aims to spend \$252.3 billion annually on defense (1981 plan: \$165 billion). Plans provide for a 3 percent annual average rate of increase in real terms, that is deducting the rate of inflation. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany serve as the pace-makers in the NATO Alliance and currently are speeding up this rate, aiming at 4-5 percent! As it is the FRG has rearmed immensely; its defense spending is second only to that of the United States (1980 more than DM60 billion). In the words of Defense Minister Apel this rearmament is "to advance full speed ahead in this and the coming year."²⁵ Japan also raised its defense budget quite spectacularly, from 1.3 trillion Yen in 1975 to more than 2 trillion Yen (roughly \$9.5 billion) in 1979.

The second aspect concerns the totally altered qualitative dimension of rearmament. At the present time this is the predominant feature of the endeavors to expand the imperialist defense potential. Using the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution and enormous financial and other resources, more and more weapons are developed or perfected and taken into service.

At the same time the following crucial trends in imperialist arms and armed forces development are emerging; they are embodied especially in NATO's long-range program and U.S. plans:

- Modernization of the nuclear and conventional arsenal of all sections of the armed forces and weapons types, especially from the aspect of quality (new weapons systems, improved precision, weapons with controllable effect, and so on--to be specific: MX 1, mobile intercontinental missile, Trident submarine system, Cruise missiles, a new generation of multiple warheads (MARV), precision guided conventional weapons, and so on);

- Measures for the major improvement of combat readiness (qualitative perfection of weapons systems, greater penetration and firepower, improvement of mobility, expansion of air defense, improvement of reserve mobilization capacity, improvement of important national and international guidance systems, and so on);

- Deepening of the military integration of NATO regional armed forces (the interlinking and cooperation of armed forces consonant with uniform strategic principles, improvements in tactical and operational coordination, standardization of leadership and deployment principles, and so on);

- The creation of globally deployable and constantly available mobile sea, air and land forces as interventionist units, in particular against countries of the Third World;

- Expansion of the infrastructure and command structure as well as standardized logistics;
- Improving the capacities for transporting reinforcements, especially in the context of worldwide distances;
- The provision of a better and more comprehensive potential for electronic combat;
- Efforts to achieve uniformity, standardization and compatibility of weapons and equipment;
- Effective rearmament cooperation.

A third new feature is the fact that, since the late 1970's, strenuous rearmament for the first time involves all three main centers of imperialism, in other words Japan also,²⁶ though the NATO sphere continues the most important center of imperialist military power and arms escalation.

The fourth aspect to be mentioned is the steadily more obvious tendency to increase the timespan of the strenuous rearmament by the main imperialist powers. That was most evident in the NATO long-range program. Subsequently every real step toward arms limitation and disarmament was immediately postponed to the distant future if not ruled impossible altogether.

The increased expansion and use of the imperialist potential for threats and intervention with regard to the national liberation movements also represents a hazard to world peace. The upsurge and deepening of the national liberation movements and the new stage of the developing countries challenge to imperialism have obviously caused influential circles of monopoly capital to fall back increasingly on the traditional weapon of military force in its various forms in order to "secure their interests" in the so-called Third World.²⁸

Strengthening the Imperialist Military Blocs and Alliances

Imperialist strategy for the conduct of the clash between the systems has lately assigned increased importance to military blocs. That is due in particular to the following fact: Military alliances are an immensely important embodiment and significant instrument of the military power of imperialism. Military blocs are considered an indispensable means for promoting the combination of all the potentials of the capitalist systems required in the interest of the maintenance of class rule. They also are to realize the principle of "total force" which, "controlled by way of military blocs," provides for "the coordinated, proportional and planned development of all military useable potentials of the imperialist system."²⁹

Moreover, military combinations also represent a specific type of movement between imperialist contradictions and the changing balance of power. In

its capacity as the major military power the United States can claim leadership in the capitalist world particularly well by way of military blocs. Furthermore it is able to use this advantage in other spheres also, such as in economic relations. At the same time and within the framework of the alliances other imperialist centers, regions or certain key countries obtain greater scope--consonant with their enhanced role--for going after their specific targets. Lastly regional defense pacts have again gained general weight and importance in the defense strategic concept of imperialism. On the basis of the approximate military parity at the "central" level (United States-USSR) the imperialists concentrate on making feasible the conduct of regional wars.

NATO--The Main Tool of Imperialist Aggressive Policy

From the standpoint of imperialist politicians and political scientists NATO continues the most important and strongest politico-military alliance and the main instrument of imperialist policy in the struggle against historico-social progress, especially the socialist community of nations. NATO has become the center of gravity, the pillar of the efforts to maintain and expand imperialist power, the most important coordinator of imperialist policy vis-a-vis the forces of the revolutionary world process.

In the further pursuit of their current policies the ruling circles of the NATO countries--headed by the United States and the FRG--have four main targets relating to the development of the North Atlantic Pact:

- a) Combination, modernization, the greatest possible uniformity and, above all, the maximum reinforcement of the aggressive military potential of the allies, in order to be able to conduct the conflict with the forces of the revolutionary world process from a position of strength.
- b) The guarantee or achievement of the most uniform possible strategy and policy of all member countries vis-a-vis the socialist nations and concerning central issues of international politics. According to the concepts of imperialist strategists NATO is to be made even more of an instrument by which to manage the extent of detente, regulate the speed and dimension of this process for their benefit and exploit detente in the imperialist interest. Here the alliance is to be used mainly for coordination, and it must be noted that NATO in general displays a strong tendency to block any advance in the process of political and military detente.
- c) Realization of NATO's claim to worldwide effectiveness. In the view of important representatives of imperialism it will be especially necessary for NATO to take on a larger role in the struggle against the forces of national and social liberation in the developing countries (in particular Africa, the Near and Middle East). The imperialists are therefore intensively aiming and working for various types (direct intervention, support for pro-imperialist forces, the creation of "accession" pacts, expansion of the NATO sphere), the extension of NATO's field of operation in these regions. NATO here has a coordinating and flanking role.

d) Reinsurance for the state monopolistic rule within the member countries. The leading NATO countries are intent on assigning policy coordination, the build-up and use of a menacing and possibly interventionist potential to the Atlantic Alliance in conjunction with the EEC and other institutions. This has the purpose of repelling the upsurge of progressive forces in their own sphere of power, noticeable in particular at NATO's southern flank.

Of course the implementation of these four targets is not without its own problems. International realities and processes, internal problems and contradictions influence events within the Pact. Consequently the opportunities to carry out the strategies and actions developed affect the shape and dimension of their implementation. However, the outlines sketched here are likely essentially to determine the line and image of NATO in the years to come.

Efforts to Establish Pact Systems in Other Regions

While NATO is the most important military alliance of imperialism its expansion is not the only one to reflect the intensification of military blocs at the present time. Japanese-American defense ties, for example, have increased considerably.³⁰ For a few years past we have also seen the beginning of contacts between NATO and Japan. The heads of the Japanese defense agencies repeatedly visited NATO headquarters as well as the most important West European member countries. Delegations from the arms industries also exchanged their experiences.

Of prime importance in the imperialist defense strategy in Asia is the alliance between the United States and South Korea, one of the most heavily armed countries in that region, which--from the imperialist viewpoint--is charged with immediate tasks in the confrontation with real socialism in the shape of the Korean Democratic People's Republic. Here also ties have been strengthened; Seoul is more and more acting as a "deputy." Within the framework of a long-range program the Americans are building up and modernizing the South Korean armed forces; in November 1978 a joint American-South Korean supreme command was set up. The plans go even further: "Activated in recent years was the...triple alliance Washington-Tokyo-Seoul."³¹ In this connection we see firmer links between Japan and South Korea, transcending the former close economic cooperation so as to involve defense also.

Activated at the same time was the ANZUS Pact involving the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Combined maneuvers are more and more frequent, extending well into the Indian Ocean--and this is something quite new. There are plans for the eventual inclusion of Japan and some Oceanic countries. Also to be noted are regular naval maneuvers transcending the pact by involving British and Canadian naval forces. The fact is also significant that the New Zealand and Australian Naval units may, by an adjustment of strategy and tactics, "in the case of war operate as part of a NATO unit."³²

Furthermore there are deliberations and efforts aimed at building up or strengthening regional imperialist defense alliances outside of Europe and the Pacific region. Let us recall the efforts to set up a South Atlantic Pact (SATO--to include South Africa, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile), to establish an alliance on the Persian Gulf to replace CENTO, the Rio Pact in Latin America (OAS), or the military aspect of the axis Washington-Cairo-Tel Aviv.

In the calculations of imperialist politics the military aspect of the alliance between imperialism and the Beijing leadership is quite preeminent. Both parties consider this dangerous alliance part of the encirclement strategy against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community. Following a visit to China U.S. Defense Secretary Brown precisely defined the nature of this alliance: "We have parallel interests in various parts of the world. We intend to initiate parallel operations."³³

He indicated one such "parallel" action--support for the counterrevolutionaries operating against Afghanistan from Pakistan.

All the most important NATO countries maintain some kind of military contact with Beijing, albeit the intensity varies. Reciprocal visits by military delegations and transactions in the arms sector have become "normal" events. Most advanced are the military relations between Beijing and the United States, though we should not overlook certain contradictions between Beijing and Washington, which set limits to the two countries alliance from defense aspects also.

Imperialism tries with all its might to use its military potential in the most varied forms for its foreign political goals. It will need the full strength and power of the socialist community of nations as well as of all peace loving forces to frustrate these dangerous plans and actions. The peace program submitted in May 1980 by the Warsaw Pact countries points the way.

FOOTNOTES

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11698

CSO: 2300

FORMER MERCHANT CAPTAIN DESCRIBES ARMS SHIPMENTS, LIFE AT SEA

Honn DIE WELT in German 21 Aug 80 p 4

[Article by Ruediger Moniac: "How the SED Keeps Its Sailors in Line; the Captain Who Came From the East"]

[Text] For almost 20 years Captain Peter Rueffer (44) sailed on GDR ships. Three weeks ago he fled to freedom in Hamburg with his 18-year old son Marian, whom he had hidden on board the MS Freital. He left his wife and a 13-year old son behind. Rueffer is now hoping that the family can be reunited. In a conversation with DIE WELT he recounts his experiences in the East German Navy and later in the merchant marine. He describes how GDR ships take tanks to Africa and what he experienced as a representative of the VEB Deutfracht Shipyard. Rueffer is now staying with friends near Kiel and hopes to obtain a position as officer on a West German ship.

Scarcely a year ago, in October 1979, Peter Rueffer, the captain of a GDR merchant ship, was presented with instructions that he had never had before: to ship tanks to Ethiopia. In a conversation with DIE WELT he remembers: "Of course I knew that the Soviet Union and the GDR were delivering arms to developing countries. But I had never experienced it myself." Captain Rueffer's ship, the Albin Koebis (7,500 gross tons displacement), was lying in Rostock harbor. He was informed by his company, VEB Deutfracht, only: "We are loading 'technical transportation'."

The Albin Koebis was to load the freight at night. Rueffer heard that the entire harbor area had been sealed off. Only "politically reliable" dockworkers were on hand. Under the cover of night, open freight cars rolled into the harbor. Their freight: old T 34 tanks, which the Soviets used to fight Hitler's Wehrmacht. Twenty were loaded by crane onto Rueffer's ship. Ten are destined for the Ethiopian harbor Assab, the other 10 for the Frelimo Freedom Front in Mozambique. This hot cargo was to be unloaded in Maputo. In addition, there was "technical equipment" in green

articles. Rueffer knew what that was: grenades, ammunition and Soviet and Czech built rapid-fire weapons. Some 3,000 tons were hoisted on board the freighter. But Rueffer did not have to deliver this "development aid" in Africa. When he boarded "his" ship the next morning to sail, he was no longer the captain. To his astonishment he learned that the company had transferred command to someone else. Why? Rueffer does not know exactly. But he does remember that he said to friends last summer: "Cargoes like that should be refused on principle." Obviously his remark was reported "to the top," to the local SED authority in Rostock and the State Security Service (Stasi). That was enough to relieve a captain at the crucial moment without any explanation. Rueffer had become a security risk for the system. For 8 months after that October day he was not allowed to board a ship. Until last June. The shortage of qualified personnel forced the company to let him sail as first officer. He told himself that a chance like this would never come again. Now he is in the West with his son.

Rueffer has had many experiences in almost 20 years of professional service with the navy and the merchant marine of the GDR. How does the GDR deal with nationals who have to be abroad in the course of their jobs? In an environment which is almost predestined to invite "desertion?" Rueffer can tell a story based on his own fate.

In 1968, when Rueffer had been captain on a freighter in the Mediterranean for only a short time, the GDR began to expand its maritime trading activities under cover of Soviet marine policy. It opened shipping offices everywhere. Rueffer applied for Athens. To prepare him for the "NATO country" he was assigned to the branch in Alexandria on the Nile by the company, which, in the interim, had come under state control. At the time the Russians were still in Egypt. Rueffer was working, unimpaired as it were, on "socialist soil."

The local GDR consul did not like how he behaved. Rueffer says: "I was only polite and open to meeting everyone. As for calling our money 'a joke'—I didn't mean anything by it." The consul was of a different opinion. Without Rueffer's knowledge he wrote to the company's head office: "Comrade Rueffer tried to gain quick popularity in the collective by his overly familiar behavior, behaving like an experienced man of the world who is at liberty to ignore certain principles of living abroad. In practical terms this came out in derogatory comments about our currency (a joke), in critical discussions of the customs regulations in seeking private contact with West German . . . nationals at the athletic club. We consider any assignment of Comrade Rueffer to a NATO country as extremely risky. Comrade Rueffer has not been told about this letter. Socialistically . . ." (Thanks to a lucky coincidence, Rueffer later succeeded in removing this letter from his "cadre file" in Rostock.)

A similar thing happened to him in 1971 in Cuba, where he took over the office in Havana a few months earlier "following good work in the GDR for

the VEB Deutscher Schiffyard." He had sailed to Havana with his family. A single man is allowed to stay abroad for a maximum of 3 months, usually much too short a time to prepare an escape.

Rueffer recalls: "I had settled down nicely with my wife and children. I was enjoying my work, mostly because, by making an effort, I was getting good orders for the company." Naturally one condition for obtaining them was again "contacts," not only with offices in Havana but with foreigners as well. The GDR wants to turn a profit on currency transactions. According to Rueffer, that means it has to engage in cross trade.

One day in Havana, a businessman from the FRG telephoned Rueffer and asked whether he could arrange a meal for him and some business associates on a GDR ship. Rueffer refused politely but neglected to report this "contact" to his embassy. Two hours after the call the embassy was on the telephone: "Why didn't you tell us that you invited a West German to a banquet on a GDR ship?"

How did the embassy know about it? Rueffer is still asking himself that question today. Was his telephone tapped, did he have a bug in the room? In any case this "tardy contact report" was enough to send Rueffer back to the GDR as being unreliable. Once there he was told: "No possibility of being a foreign representative until further notice."

The informant system has been perfected not only in foreign countries, but on GDR ships as well. Since 1976, so Rueffer reported, a ministerial decree has existed for the preservation of order and security. It appoints the captain as the "political and specialized instructor of the crew." He has to direct their work "according to the resolutions of the party and the government." Naturally the captain has to be in the SED. No one says it straight out, explained Rueffer, but it holds true. The company has to see to it that as many crew members as possible are also in the party. The captain possesses a vital disciplinary tool in his dealings with the crew: a seaman's certification papers. They are not simply documents stating that the owner is a sailor. For him it is as valuable as a passport. Anyone having them withdrawn cannot continue going to sea. The authority to withdraw them rests with the captain. Before the ship reaches a "capitalist harbor" he has to instruct the crew to avoid any contacts. Shore leave is granted only to groups and for a few hours only. Besides, the sailors have so little money to spend (DM 3.50 per day) that they can scarcely afford to buy anything, and certainly not an escape.

The position of "political officer" on the Soviet model has also existed on GDR ships for more than 3 years. According to Rueffer he is the "party's executive organ on board." With his "help" the informant network is working better than ever.

BRIEFS

POSSIBLE SEMINARIAN EXPULSION--According to reliable reports from Budapest, 15 members of the Central Seminary [Kozponti Papnevelo Intezet] issued a statement of solidarity with one of their fellow seminarians, Gyorgy Kocsi, who maintained contact with catholic groups not officially recognized by the State Office of Church Affairs. Due to his contacts, the ordination of Kocsi became subject to doubt. Laszlo Lekai, archbishop of Esztergom and Istvan Bagi, bishop-rector, termed the statement of the seminarians "open rebellion" and called for strict punishment of the signators. Allegedly, Cserehati, bishop of Pecs assured the protestors of his sympathy. Facing expulsion are primarily the four seminarians who personally delivered the statement to Archbishop Lekai and Bishop Bagi: Jozsef Lanko, Gyorgy Szekely, Zoltan Uzassy and Janos Wildmann. [Text] [Paris IKODALMI UJSAG in Hungarian Jul-Aug 80 p 12]

CSO: 2500

NORWEGIAN PRO-PRC ORGAN REPORTS FROM GDANSK ON STRIKES

Norway Union Supports

Oslo KLASSEKAMPEN in Norwegian 28 Aug 80 p 0

[Interview with Torstein Arnesen by Arne Jorama]

[Text] "International workers' solidarity means supporting the Polish workers' demands, not pointing a finger at them and urging 'caution.' Obviously there is a limit to how far the Polish workers can go. The Soviet Union is still hovering in the wings. But I am convinced that the Polish workers themselves know that limit best."

That is the comment of Torstein Arnesen, chairman of the Telephone Exchange Installers' Union, on the highly controversial question of international support to the Polish workers. His union adopted a resolution of support that was reported in KLASSEKAMPEN yesterday.

"A free and independent trade union movement is just as important for the Polish workers as for us. They are stressing that demand as the most important. It is a demand that every shop steward and every organized worker in Norway will understand the importance of and should support just as we support workers in Portugal, South Africa, and South America."

[Question] Half a million workers all over the country are now striking for the same demands, and the strike seems to be quite well organized. What do you think is the explanation for the fact that this can happen in Poland? Such a strike movement seems entirely unrealistic, for example, in Norway.

[Answer] First of all, we are dealing here with the most open society that there is in East Europe. The treatment of opposition groups in Poland seems to me to be a good deal milder than in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In Poland at least they do not land in a mental hospital, but are quickly released as a rule after arrests. It is natural that they react to meat shortages and price increases.

that as in Norway you perhaps learn something from most easily is how fundamental the right to strike is for working people. Union members here in Norway should keep an eye on the forces in this country that want to take the right to strike away from us.

At the same time that there are limits to what the Soviets will stand for, the situation is that they have problems in many other places right now, that does reduce the inclination to intervene.

[Question] The Norwegian LO [Federation of Trade Unions] has its contacts with the state-controlled union movement in Poland. Should those contacts be broken off now?

[Answer] It is hard to say right now. We do not yet know the concrete content of the free trade union movement in Poland. For example, we do not know whether they want a union movement inside or outside of the Polish LO. It may well be that their objective is for the Polish LO to be transformed into a free trade union movement.

[Question] What do you think about the attitude of the LO leadership?

[Answer] I have read that they have decided on a statement of support by the Norwegian LO. But until I know what that statement contains, it seems to me it is difficult to comment on it accurately.

So says Torstien Arnesen, who feels it natural to debate the international parts of the LO's program of action in the light of what is happening now in Poland.

Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia Demands

Oslo KLASSEKAMPEN in Norwegian 27 Aug 80 p 15

[Text] Well, we have gotten into the world press. Our little performance at the strike meeting in Gdansk was dull--but unfortunately very erroneously--reported in the otherwise well-informed and accurate big French newspaper LE MONDE.

As reported in KLASSEKAMPEN Saturday [23 August], KLASSEKAMPEN's special correspondent was asked to talk on the Lenin dockyard about the demonstrations of 21 August in Norway. We did so; what we were to say was translated and written down in Polish, and the appeal was read out in Norwegian. Lech Walesa, the strike leader, thought the content was a little too political, and asked the interpreter whether he could change it a little. The interpreter immediately put the question to the meeting--which would not permit any changes! And all the resolutions were presented to the meeting--against the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and for the Polish workers' fight. And just behind us sat a calm strike leader, grinning broadly. And what did LE MONDE make out of that? We quote from an article of 23 August:



KLASSEKAMPEN's correspondent, Tuva Gry Øyan, talking at the strike meeting in Gdansk about the demonstrations on 21 August in Norway. In the background, members of the strike committee.

"And then it was the turn of a woman activist from the Marxist-Leninist party in Norway to spout a lot of nonsense and launch into a harangue against the intervention in Afghanistan. It was too much, since the leaders of the MKS [Inter-Factory Strike Committee] had spent the day--as a counteroffensive against the government's propaganda--explaining that it is a trade union movement and not a political movement, that it is not a fig leaf for the opposition, that it is not hostile to the USSR and does not favor changing Poland's alliances."

Well, well, LE MONDE--where were you during that particular meeting?

Local Party Chief Recants

[In] KLASSEKAMPEN in Norwegian 29 Aug 80 p 16

[Reportage by Tuva Gry Øyan; photos by Leif Gabrielsen]

[Text] "I swear on the cross that I am with you! I was wrong before, but now I have realized what is right, and have joined the strikers."

The man on the podium is little and short. When he comes forward to swear, we are aware of a small sensation. Our interpreter has just explained



I swear by the cross that I am
with you!

in a well-known novel by Henryk Sienkiewicz, the world-renowned Polish writer. In the book "Potop" the author has the Pole Andrzej Kmiec go into the service of the Swedes in the war against Sweden in the 17th century. The aged Andrzej realized that he had been taken in by the Swedes, and found his way back to his own people. For our friend on the Lenin deckyard it was not quite so simple.

Interrogated by the Workers

For as soon as he sat down again among the other delegates, the workers began a regular interrogation: What is your job? What kind of education have you got? Primary school, high school, technical school?

No, he had not gone to any technical school. How did you get the position you have got now? No other worker gets ahead so easy without education. And just what is your job exactly? What do you do when you are working? A colleague of the "accused," in the same delegation, undertook his defense.

"I have worked with him for 10 years, and can guarantee that he is a good fellow."

that he is a local party boss who has now made common cause with the strikers. He is first secretary in the party in the little town of Prusick Gdanski, just outside the strike center of Gdansk. Not one of the real big shots, but snugly placed in the bureaucracy. Now he is on the Lenin deckyard as representative of three striking plants in his town.

While he is talking several workers have gotten up and come forward with shouts that we did not understand a word of. But the applause that follows his speech is surprisingly light.

"I Was a Potop!"

Like the prodigal son in the Bible story of our childhood, he stands there and has to listen while the leaders of the meeting recite before all those present what a "catalog of sins" he has: Delegate from his district to party congress after party congress, a safe position in the party's executive committee in the Gdansk province. "I was a Potop!" he says repentantly. He is likening himself to the principal character



What job have you got now? How did you get that job? What do you work with? Who are you really? WHAT DO YOU WANT TO ACHIEVE?

"How long have you worked together?"

"Oh, well, 5 years."

"Then no doubt you can say what he works with. Is he in a production line, or does he sit in an office?"

"Well, as for just exactly what he works with..."

No, that did not get the interrogation taken care of. The suspicion was sharpened. Was he an *agent provocateur*, sent out by the party to split the workers, or was he just plain dumb? The interpreters cannot entirely agree among themselves; one insists that the fellow is the party's emissary: "The party loss smell clings to him, the way he talks, the words he uses. He apologizes too much. 'I have a wife and children to think about,' he keeps saying. But who hasn't?" Another is less sure: "But most likely spontaneous strikes did break out in the three small plants he says he is representing. And the workers agreed to elect a joint strike committee. The party committee was still on the spot, and it put up opposing candidates and the election took place without anybody's thinking much about it."



Yes, I know, I was wrong, but I had a wife and children to think of!

Three Million Party Members

"But among the three million party members in the country the strike must have some support," we asked.

"Undoubtedly, among the ordinary members. I should think that at least 30 percent of those who are gathered here are party members," is the answer. "But that character is no ordinary member. He is a boss, who has made a very good thing out of his position in the party. That is why it is so hard to believe him when he says he is supporting us all out. For where was he before, when we might have really really needed his support?"

Atheist Swearing on the Cross

And the workers had several touchy questions in store.

"Why are you swearing on the cross? You are an atheist, are you not?"

The answer came straight out and with no attempt at explaining away: "I know that most of the workers are religious, and I counted on their believing me if I swore on the cross. This is the first time I have done it, but I will gladly do it again if you want me to."

"Why should you? Swearing on the cross or the red star is the easiest thing in the world." The formal meeting was over, but around our local "Potop" the waves of controversy still ran high. Should he be allowed to stay there, or be thrown out? Was he a scoundrel, or just dumb? Was he just pretending, or had he broken with the party as he said he had? A harmless opportunist, perhaps, who after serving the party for many years was now changing horses, because that looked like being the safest?

The crowd finally melted away, and he got to stay on the docks. The next day we saw him again among the other strikers, a little red-faced, maybe, but still right there.

8815

CSO: 3108

POLISH-FRENCH CULTURAL RELATIONS NOTED

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 16 Jul 80 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Jean-Philippe Lecat, French Minister of Culture and the Media, by ZYCIE WARSZAWY permanent correspondent Leszek Kolodziejczyk: "Culture Brings Poland and France Closer Together"]

[Text] Prior to his visit to Poland (16-20 July), French Minister of Culture Jean-Phillipe Lecat was interviewed by a ZYCIE WARSZAWY correspondent on Polish-French cultural relations.

[Question] What is the Minister's opinion on the subject of development of cultural relations between Poland and France?

[Answer] Both our countries are nations with a great past, the history and cultural heritage of which are particularly rich. It is obvious that all areas of the arts and cultural exchange developing between our countries make a profound contribution to the friendship which binds them and which leaves numerous evidences in cultural affairs. One is pleased with the role played in Paris by the Polish Institute and in Warsaw and Krakow by the French Institutes, the goal of which is to create and deepen public awareness in both countries toward their cultures. It is my wish that there could develop even broader exchange, which is already quite fruitful, between the youth of both countries. Last fall the French Culture Days in Poland and the Polish Culture Days in France, in various areas -- film, books, theater, recreation, music, and sculpture -- constituted an intensive area of exchange.

[Question] What areas of Polish creative activity were in the Minister's opinion particularly warmly received by the French public?

[Answer] Poland's creative artistic activity and cultural heritage are perceived by the French to be close enough to our own to evoke a strong response, and sufficiently different for this exchange to be received with constantly fresh interest. Among those areas of artistic creativity which find particular favor with the French public, I should like to mention our enthusiasm for Polish music, cinema and theater, as well as Polish folklore

and graphic art, which is so admirably represented by Polish poster art. I should also mention the success enjoyed in France, at the Culture House in Nanterre, by the play by Witkiewicz in a Andrzej Wajda production, and I might also mention numerous showings of Polish film throughout France. We would also like to see more collaboration between French and Polish cinematography. I hope that Andrzej Wajda's projects in this area reach fruition.

[Question] How does the Minister interpret the certain disproportion between French cultural presence in Poland, which is more extensive and deeper than the Polish cultural presence in France?

[Answer] Noting development of cultural relations for the purpose of deepening Polish-French friendship, we are all concerned with the question of what means to undertake in order to strengthen the presence of Polish culture in France. Together with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, we attach great importance to increasing all forms of dialogue between our two cultures and to making the French public even more aware of Polish culture. From this standpoint the mass media would seem to be very important. Greater film and TV collaboration and publication of modern works of Polish literature in the French language seem to me to be in this respect basic means leading to an increase in interest in Polish culture by the French public. I would also like to see more frequent holding of Polish culture weeks, both at the local and national level, and I would like to see them representative for the culture of both countries. Incidentally, all these projects are being incorporated into a three-year cultural exchange program to be discussed by a mixed commission.

[Question] Mister Minister, what plans for stepping up mutual cultural exchange will you be taking to Poland?

[Answer] Completely separate from the culture week, we shall be presenting important plays, after the model, for example, of the Renaud-Barrault Theater, which took part in the most recent festival of international theaters in Warsaw. The Rolanda Petit Ballet is preparing for a tour in Poland scheduled for June of 1981. In the area of plastic arts exhibits, we are planning an exchange between the Pompidou Center and the Polish museums in Lodz; there are also plans for a future Charles de Gaulle exhibit, to open in Warsaw next fall, as well as a series of events in November dedicated to Apollinaire. I should also like to mention a very important area, that of exchange of information in the area of preservation of works of art and monuments. A seminar of Polish and French experts in this field will be held in Nancy at the end of 1980. I should also like to express the wish that other persons active in Polish culture follow the example of Andrzej Wajda and come to Paris to collaborate with our artistic centers. And I should like to state that my plans include talking with Minister of Culture and Art Zygmunt Najdowski.

[Question] Mister Minister, what role in your opinion can be played by development of cultural relations in the process of détente between European countries?

[Answer] Culture plays an indispensable role in bringing peoples closer together: it arouses interest, which penetrates people's minds and hearts, in the traditions, way of life, in the cultural heritage and creative affairs of other peoples. Thanks to culture a foreigner becomes "one's own," while peoples and societies can learn to know and understand one another better. From this standpoint cultural exchange between Poland and France is of a most highly exemplary character thanks to the outstanding results which have been achieved. I would like to see similar agreements based on cultural ties which are rooted deeply in both of our nations also extend to other European countries.

3024

CSO: 2600

POLISH-FRENCH CULTURAL RELATIONS, PRINCIPAL THEMES OUTLINED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 18 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by Bernard Margueritte]

[Text] Mr Jean-Philippe Lecat, minister of Culture and Communications, yesterday began a 4-day visit to Poland, which should provide a new stimulus to the cultural relations between the two countries. These relations, incidentally, have already developed in a very harmonious manner, especially since the signing, during President Giscard-d'Estaing's visit to Warsaw in 1975, of a "declaration" on this matter, in some respects much bolder than the Helsinki accords signed afterwards.

What are the principal themes brought up during Mr Lecat's visit? There are basically four:

- 1) Cooperation in matters of restoration as much of works of art as of cities. The Poles have in this domain, and with reason, exceptional accomplishments. This is why, in this year of the patrimony, a French-Polish Congress devoted to restoration will take place in December in Nancy.
- 2) Exchanges from Poland with the Pompidou Center: a Polish exposition will be prepared in Paris while Poland will organize next year a Charles de Gaulle exposition. The exchanges should also extend to posters, photography, painting, to the theatre and to the avant-garde cinema.
- 3) Problems of the sale of French books in Poland and of Polish books in France: one of the objectives of the French party is to maintain the level reached by the diffusion of French books. However, the Poles hope in this respect that more translations of Polish works will be brought out in our country. But despite some successes (books by Kusniewicz) we remain a long way off in this.
- 4) Teaching and spread of the languages: French comes in third place in Poland in the high school, after German and English. According to the reform of the Polish system of education, all young Poles between thirteen and seventeen are now going to study a Western language. It is a matter of

...which that Asia does not translate into a weakening of our position.
[However, an effort is being made in France for the teaching of Polish:
in three years, the number of high schools where the Polish language is
taught will rise from 2 to 17 while Polish courses are given in 17 univer-
sities.]

Therefore French-Polish cultural relations are going well. Poland is in
second place with regard to the university accords concluded by France (60
universities or graduate schools have contacts with this country) and she
is our third partner in youth exchanges. Currently, two thousand young
people from each country are participating in these each year. The objec-
tive is to reach five thousand in 1983.

An accord in this domain will be signed, moreover, during President Giscard-
d'Estaing's visit to Poland in September. In the course of the last two
months, a thousand Poles have come to France on cultural exchanges. After
all, France devotes to its cultural relations with Poland a budget greater
than the one it uses with all of the other socialist countries together,
except the Soviet Union.

Q: where are we heading now?

A: New perspectives are taking shape which Mr Lecat's visit will no doubt con-
tribute to making concrete.

4/28
CNR: 11201

PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC CONTROVERSY OVER TERRITORIAL RIGHTS NOTED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 1 Aug 80 p 7

[Article: "Poland: The War of Religions"]

[Text] A bitter religious controversy has just broken out in Poland which already has enough with which to contend. Polish Catholics living in Warmia and Mazury, in the country's northeast, have, within the last few months, forcibly taken possession of five Protestant churches. Naturally, the Protestant Church has violently protested this action in which it is implicating the Polish Episcopate and even John Paul II himself, and has launched a campaign which some of the West German and Swiss press has taken up.

The inquiry into the facts of the case, however, shows that this campaign is, to say the least, excessive.

Before the war, 800,000 Protestants lived in this territory governed by Germany. Today there are no more than 3,000 or 4,000 and this number each year is dwindling since the Protestants are taking advantage of the move to reunite families to emigrate to the Federal Republic. On the other hand, following liberation, this area was populated by Polish and Catholic families who came from countries east of Poland which the Soviet Union had annexed.

Under these circumstances, the Catholics were left without any church whereas the Protestant churches frequently had no congregation. In 1972, therefore, the Polish Episcopate appealed to the country's authorities to grant acknowledgment that year of the ownership of the property not only to the Catholic Church but also to other religious persuasions. At the same time, the Warmia diocese offered to buy back 10 Protestant churches. It had to wait 5 and 6 years to conclude the agreements in only four cases.

One of these cases was that of the Rozogi church. The sale, however, was not concluded until after the Catholics had taken possession of this church already abandoned and closed and after many refusals to sell or rent it to the Catholics. On the other hand, no agreement was concluded at either Baranow, where the Catholics occupied a ruined church which was being used as a refuge for gangs of ruffians, nor at Spychowo, where the remaining 10

Protestants still refused to grant the 1,000 Catholics there the chance to hold their religious services with them, the church was then finally occupied and the Protestant authorities returned the rent which the Catholics had paid.

According to an official statement from the Warmia See, this lamentable affair also involves a question of pounds, shillings and pence. The Protestant Church has finally proposed the sale of the eight churches for the sum of 25 million zlotys, which is about twice the value which the civil experts estimated. This being so, the Catholic Church has been obliged to negotiate otherwise step by step against considerable odds.

What the Warmia and Mazury Catholics find most exasperating in the case, judging by what has happened in it so far, is that the Protestants apparently prefer to see their churches fall completely into ruins, to be used for potato storage, or if worst comes to worst, to be conveyed to civil authorities rather than to renting them or selling them to the Catholic Church. We can only hope that inspired by the spirit of ecumenism, this distressing problem will eventually be solved. But who, in Poland, in the present instance, is so much as giving thought to this ecumenism?

8870

CSO: 1100

PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS HAILED

Bucharest *CONTEMPORANUL* in Romanian 27 Jun 80 p 12

[Article by Victor Ducelescu: "Non-Interference in Internal Affairs--A Decade and One-Half of Unceasing Promotion of a New Feature in International Policy"]

[Text] The high principles, dynamism, and innovative spirit impressed on Romanian foreign policy by the 9th Party Congress represented, during the last 15 years, constant attributes of the international activity of our country. Romania and its president distinguish themselves as a vivid, effective presence, as one of the most active factors of contemporaneity in the fight for the cause of peace and progress of mankind. The history of contemporary Romania has never known such a dynamic, constructive period in international activity. Already, at the 9th Congress, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stated: "The international policy of our country has as a lasting, steady foundation--the principles of sovereignty and national independence, equal rights, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual advantage. Romania militates for the consistent promotion of these principles in the international arena, considering their observance as essential condition for developing collaboration among states, strengthening trust among peoples, respecting the inalienable right of every people to decide upon its destiny."

Building a new international democratic system based upon respect for the independence and sovereignty of all the peoples, upon the prohibition of the use of force and the threat to use force, requires the strict observance of the principle of non-interference in the internal and external affairs of any country. As a matter of fact, this principle takes on, more and more nowadays, like the other primordial norms of behavior of states, the importance of a fundamental principle of the international law and morality, which has its observance directly linked to the solution of international crises, and the affirmation of a free and independent life for each nation.

Historically, the affirmation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and peoples is directly linked to the recognition of the idea of sovereignty of states, to the affirmation of the

independence of nations in the contemporary world. As it is known, the prevention of any foreign interference in the internal affairs of a people, the free election of its social or political system, the affirmation of a domestic and foreign policy in accordance with its national interests necessarily derive from respect for sovereignty. Enunciated for the first time in the works of several well-known theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries, such as Wolff, Puffendorf and Vattel, and entered in the documents of the 1791 French Revolutionary Convention, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of peoples was to be quickly forgotten by those who proposed to build up a European system based on disregard for the peoples' interests and on the balance of the relations of force among the then big powers. Proclaimed as a reaction against a possible foreign intervention on the American continent, the "Monroe Doctrine" was to turn also, in a very short time, into a policy of justifying North-American interests on the whole continent.

Although there were numerous reactions against the policy of intervention, the acts of interference in the internal affairs of peoples characterized a whole historical epoch of conflicts and violations of the peoples' rights, the policy of intervention, interweaving, in the course of time, with the manifestations of force and threats to use force and directly serving the attaining of the hegemonistic or aggressive aims of some powers interested in dominating other peoples. The history of acts of intervention is very long and comprehensive. The Romanian people, located at the crossroads of several big empires, had to firmly defend its independence and national being against many attempts at interference in its internal affairs. The counter-revolutionary attempts of interference in the affairs of the young Soviet state, the failed attempts to impede the success of the Chinese revolution, the neo-colonialist policy of "recouping" the young independent states, etc. are well-known.

In our epoch, the forms of intervention have been expanded and diversified--from political and military intervention to ideological or cultural intervention, from openly proclaiming the right to intervene in the affairs of some states or peoples to the most refined justifications which try to legitimate the interventions by "humanitarian reasons," satisfying various "superior interests" or, what is truly paradoxical, "protecting" the interests of the state which had its affairs interfered with.

The politological theories which start from the primacy of power in international relations and try to substantiate various models of organizing relations among nations based on the balance of the economic, political or military force, leave, in fact, an open door for intervention as a current practice in relations among nations. According to several western authors, "power" and "influence" might, in fact, be related concepts, if not identical ones. Even some "theoreticians" of international law who acknowledge that armed intervention would be prohibited by the norms and principles of law presently in force for relations among nations, do not hesitate to state that the simple "interferences" could, however, be permitted and

accepted! If the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, as such, established by the United Nations' Charter and by many international documents, cannot be questioned as a whole, one tries to demonstrate that certain exceptions to the incidence of this principle should, however, be accepted: those actions which states undertake in order to protect, as they pretend, certain superior interests; the values of civilization and human rights, the fate or belongings of their citizens who live in other countries, where they, supposedly, do not have enough "security" etc. The technique of having other principles of international law running counter to the principle of non-intervention, of attempting to classify the principles of international law as "chief"- and "secondary" ones, with those in the first category (collaboration, human rights etc.) coming before the principle of non-intervention, is widely used.

The attempts to justify interventions are taking on nowadays the most diverse forms; an appeal to domestic forces with non-existent or ridiculous political meaning is often made. The practice of intervention also knows a wide variety of interpretations of the international documents, just in order to justify actions of this sort. But there are many circumstances in which the norms and principles of law which are inconvenient for those who undertake acts of intervention are simply violated without resorting to any sort of justifications. As far as the practical methods of committing acts of intervention are concerned, these are varied and affect the most diversified spheres of the exercise of the national sovereignty of the people. The interventions may, first of all, refer to the domestic and foreign policy of states, trying to divert it from its natural aims of guarding the national interests, and may aim at acquiring economic positions in a certain country--to the disadvantage of the respective people and to create favorable positions for other countries concerned. Extremely dangerous are those interventions which aim at sharpening conflicts among certain countries, usually small- or medium-sized ones and developing states interventions which tend to perpetuate conflict and tension situations in certain regions, to involve the peoples in a policy of arms, preventing them from concentrating on their natural aims of raising the living standards, of building an independent life.

Socialist Romania firmly expresses itself against any forms of intervention in the internal and external affairs of states, since it considers that they disregard the sovereign rights of the peoples to decide their fate independently, to establish their own options for development in accordance with the national interests, since they artificially stimulate conflict situations, endangering peaceful collaboration among nations and peoples. In the view of our country, the acts of intervention represent a negation of international legality, of the democracy which should rule over relations among nations, a brutal violation of the relations of dignity and respect which are the only guarantee of peaceful cooperation among nations in our epoch.

The foreign policy doctrine of Romania, President Nicolae Ceausescu's view of the new international economic and political order, consider the

principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of peoples as one of the pillars of the future international democratic system, based on equality and equity, on the full and final prohibition of force and the threat to use force. The deep attachment of Romania to this principle is reflected in the fact that it is consistently, even without exception, established in all international documents signed by Romania, together with other norms of international behavior which must be observed for establishing a climate of international peace and security. The secretary general of our Party, the President of Romania, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu forcefully stressed that conflict situations which have lead to tension phenomena in the international life, such as those in Africa, the Near East, Afghanistan and South-East Asia must be resolved by respecting the peoples' right to self-determination, putting an end to the interference in their internal affairs, respecting their sovereignty and independence.

In the view of Romania, there is a strong and indissoluble link between non-interference, respect for sovereignty and the right of every people to freely decide upon its destiny. The affirmation of a free and independent life, the protection of revolutionary accomplishments can only be achieved if the great principles of international law and morality which must rule relations among all the nations are strictly observed, if the policy of intervention and interference will definitely be replaced, in relations among states, by a policy of active cooperation, based on respect for equality, dignity and recognition of the sovereign rights of each and every people.

4715

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

NEW CHIEF EDITOR--The July 1980 issue of VIATA MILITARA, the monthly organ of the Higher Political Council of the Ministry of National Defense, lists Ion Jianu as the publication's chief editor. The June issue and previous issues listed Dumitru Radulescu in this position. The rest of the members of the editorial board are the same: Nicolae Briceag, Ion Capet, Nicolae Dumbrava, Mircea Grama, Adrian Merlusca (deputy chief editor), and Gheorghe Tudoroiu. [Editorial Report]

CSG: 2700

CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER FINANCING OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS

Effectiveness of Expenditures Questioned

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1543, 27 Jul 80
pp 8-10

[Article by Dragos Ivanovic: "How Does the Federation Husband Its Funds?"]

[Text] It is from the Federation that come our constitution, laws, decisions, resolutions, conclusions and an abundance of various sublegal acts. These enactments prescribe, advise or demand--especially in this time of stabilization--that we all behave more reasonably so that the economy as a whole and every individual at his work station conducts a more stewardly business operation.

Yet how does the Federation husband its funds? Whereas the talk and the writing go on at great length about the mistakes in enterprises, self-managed special-interest communities, and even opstinas, very little is known about the operation of federal bodies and agencies. In fact our knowledge about how funds are actually husbanded in society decreases as we climb up toward the "top."

Moment of Confrontation

But there is one moment during the year when the talk is more frank in this area. This is the assembly's examination of the final statement of the federal budget for the past year. Whereas the previous examination of this document was mainly routine and a formality, now examination of the final statement is a studious and critical examination of how federal bodies, agencies and organizations have been spending the money they get from the budget.

The assembly's examination of the final statement arouses interest and instills confidence above all because of the way in which this job is approached. The budget committee set up several working groups of delegates which for months has examined the accounts of several federal bodies, agencies and organizations. To that extent these will certainly have a stronger

response from the public when they are published, because they are authoritative.

Pictures and Works of Art

As is to be seen from these reports, the Federation possesses a considerable number of pieces of movable and immovable property. Though this is not exactly something one does not know, it is not a bad thing to insist on it once again, since the value of federal "property" is growing steadily, every year huge funds are allocated from the budget, as can be seen from the extensive programs for construction and modernization of various services. Merely the value of the fixed capital managed by the service for entertainment exceeds 100 billion old dinars, and this sector is by no means decisive to the economical business operation of the Federation.

Many of these items represent important historical, cultural and artistic value. Our attention is caught by the large "repository of pictures and other works of art," as stated in the report. It is quite natural that institutions at that high level should have works of art, but the trouble, and this also caught the eye of the delegates, is that the records on these items are poor, and they are not kept in exactly the best manner.

Nor is there any code of regulations on who and in what manner can make use of these rare and valuable items, and this gives rise to odd situations, to put it mildly. When certain officials change offices, they demand that the pictures and works of art be moved along with their desk!

Fine, that might even be a bizarre aspect of this serious issue. But what is most essential in all this, the thing that the delegates also emphasize, is that "there is a need in general to study the purpose for keeping this treasury of art in offices and basements, inaccessible to the public and to culture." And what is most important, there is a need in the end to state exactly who can acquire these valuable things and under what conditions.

Vehicles Running Around--Expensive

Let us take the way in which vehicles are used. The garage of the Federal Executive Council has 74 models of automobiles belonging to 19 different makes, and two-thirds are big cars. In this period of dizzying price rises of gasoline and of expensive spare parts, all of this is becoming extremely uneconomical. That is why a law has been prepared which but for exceptional cases prohibits foreign cars to be imported for federal bodies and agencies, but certainly other economy measures will be needed in addition to this.

There is still no social compact which would regulate the manner of use of vehicles for all bodies, agencies and organizations in the Federation. Vehicles are used at personal discretion and for long trips, though there are trains and airplanes. Some chauffeurs complain that they are frequently

forced to wait for officials a long time at airports or in front of buildings where meetings are being held. Some drivers even work 15 hours a day for this reason.

So long as we are talking about cars, the following detail also attracts our attention. The garage has 19 buses and 5 minibuses which are mostly used to carry 1,200 office workers (which is only 7 percent of those employed). They "bring in" 5 million old dinars, but they cost about 650 million old dinars. They are also used frequently for trade union outings.

We Are All Suffering From the Same Disease

All these cases, though utterly different in domain and forms of use of the funds, have something in common: there are no optimum programs or clear regulations or agreements containing precise criteria as to when various things can be done or purchased. The reader will easily recognize this pattern for an ailment which is common everywhere. Almost all our enterprises and various other organizations also suffer from a lack of such documents, and there is public discussion, often backed up with arguments, to the effect that this is a breach through which tremendous public funds are madly leaking away.

The fact that improvisation is so widespread is certainly no justification for anyone individually.

It seems, nevertheless, that the consequences of the unregulated relations are felt most seriously in connection with the allocation and use of dwellings. Since the use of the dwelling for official use has not been clearly defined, some people hold on to them even when they no longer hold their position, though their family has a dwelling which is public property at their place of residence. "It is a rather widespread phenomenon to get more than one dwelling," it was said in the debate, "and for dwellings to be allocated to meet the needs of the extended family at the expense of the budget, which makes it difficult to resolve personnel issues."

Some Have More Than One Dwelling Unit

A goodly portion of the dwellings are allocated without going through the special-interest community for housing, and dwellings are also adapted without going through the community. The striking discrepancies are also noted in construction. Federal bodies and agencies fulfilled the 5-year program for housing construction at a level of only 17 percent, while the special-interest community of the Yugoslav People's Army fulfilled its program at a level of 104 percent. Both of them federal entities, but such a difference.

It seems equally strange that individuals should have a different status from one community to another. The rights and obligations of tenants are one thing in military housing, something else in a special-interest

community of federal bodies and agencies, and still something else in the housing community of Belgrade. Even in the same building there may be differences in rights and obligations which tenants are to exercise and discharge to the housing community. And how then is it with those who have their housing in the capitals of the republics?

The list of oversights established in the handling of funds might also be considerably longer. The programs for noneconomic investments of federal bodies and agencies was not, however, taken up on this occasion. This was left to later, but one can suspect that there are irregularities here as well from this clearly formulated remark:

"If associated labor knew how certain consumers of the budget are husbanding their funds, they would soon demand that all the laws be amended that hold those responsible for noneconomic investments in a privileged position."

A Welcome Coincidence

It was quite a random coincidence that the rebalancing of the budget for this year happened to be on the agenda the past few days in the bodies of the assembly at the same time as the year-end budget statement for last year. The coincidence, however, turned out to be a welcome one, since it afforded everyone a very worthwhile chance to supplement their knowledge on a topic that is always relevant--how does the Federation actually husband its funds?

Of course, the sponsor of the rebalancing of the budget was the Federal Executive Council, and this entire matter, according to the original explanations, appeared to be so indisputable and simple from the accounting standpoint that abbreviated procedure was even sought for amendment of the budget. It is a question of increasing the federal budget, which for this year amounts to about 130 billion dinars, by 21 billion, the amount by which the federal treasury has been left "lighter," partly because of the recent devaluation, but to a greater extent because of the drop in certain federal revenues.

But the delegates have made a fundamental political issue out of what might have appeared to some a more or less routine step. When a clear commitment has been made against everything lost through devaluation being made up in the economy through higher prices, why should the federal budget be allowed that privilege? So long as enterprises are economizing, let there be equal economizing in the Federation. Certainly they will in some respects feel the shortage of budget funds, but a new budget equilibrium can be established by restricting expenditures on the other side.

The proposal for rebalancing the federal budget was postponed for September, when it shall be taken up under the regular and not the emergency procedure!

This episode is certainly characteristic of the atmosphere at the moment in society, which can be expressed most easily by asking these questions which, to be sure, are constant ones: Are we all prepared to bear equally the burden of the inevitable stabilization?

Analysis, Statistics

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1543, 27 Jul 80
pp 8-9

[Article by Velizar Zecevic: "Budget Under the Magnifying Glass"]

[Text] When there is a particular liveliness in the benches of the assembly, it is the budget on the agenda. The accounts of the government have never been small, and the dilemmas are large. There are many people who are striving to find a more comfortable place in the shade of the government budget, but at the same time everyone wants the budget to be as small as possible and to be spent as optimally as possible.

This is just the third year since the new principles went into effect for shaping the federal budget under the new constitution and the Law on Financing the Federation. The system for financing the Federation is based on the principles of community unity, the needs and interests of all republics and provinces in performance of the functions of the Federation. The republics and provinces have a decisive impact on all budget revenues, as do expenditures determined in advance by specific laws. To be sure, the budget does have its own revenues (customs duties, a portion of the turnover tax), but if they prove to be inadequate, and this has always been the case in the last 3 years, the republics and provinces have to make up the difference through their contributions.

The system for financing the Federation, then, is clear and in conformity with its functions. The budget's revenues are precisely set forth and reliable. Everything is agreed on and established concerning expenditures. Nevertheless, whatever there is spent, revenues are always greater than expenditures, and the so-called deficit financing of the budget has become a rule that has known no exceptions for some 10 years now.

This kind of situation with the budget is an expression of economic instability and inflation, but the budget itself, with its constant deficit and in view of the tremendous amounts involved (about 13 percent of the gross social product) is also one of the serious causes of instability. For years now the prevailing conviction has been that all budgets, that of the Federation above all, should not be increased, as it is put, faster than the growth of the social product. The endeavor to implement that principle has been set down in law for two sizable items of budgetary expenditures--the financing of the Yugoslav People's Army and supplemental financing of the underdeveloped republics and Kosovo--while other expenditures are limited by the level of total budgetary revenues, which are established every

year. However, the budget is adopted in advance, and not after the fact, so that differences between what has been planned and anticipated and what has actually taken place must be settled subsequently.

For that reason, but not for that reason alone, a budget deficit comes about which usually is a main topic of assembly debates when the budget is up for adoption. The deficit financing of the budget is not a new phenomenon in the world; many governments resorted to this solution several decades ago. Of the two possible ways of overcoming a shortage of budget funds--either from existing social accumulation or from future accumulation, by spending in advance--we, involuntarily to be sure, but almost regularly, have used a third--a portion of the budget, often as much as half, comes from the primary issue of money, that is, from that money which is issued to cover augmented production and the rise of prices.

The deficit, then, remains what it is. It can either be replenished, and that creates new budget expenditures for which one must set aside a larger share of the social product, or one must curtail some of the rights of those who live on the budget.

The order of magnitude is such that payment of what has been postponed or not settled up to now would so augment the budgetary spending of the Federation that more than 13 percent of the social product would be required to cover it all. And this would then signify that the principle that budget spending ought to grow slower than the social product would turn into its opposite: 7 years ago the federal budget took away 11.5 percent of the social product, though certain obligations of the Federation have in the meantime been passed on to the republics and provinces.

"The principal cause of problems in balancing the federal budget and deficit financing should not be sought in the system of financing the Federation, but in its practical application," engineer Petar Kostic said at a recent meeting of the Federal Social Council in Belgrade. At the same time, the federal secretary for finance conveyed to members of the council the position taken by the Federal Executive Council, to the effect that it is "indispensable to examine the division of the social product as a whole and the share of the federal budget in that context."

What can be done in this respect?

Without touching either the principle that the federal budget has its own revenues nor the arrangement embodying the system whereby the republics and provinces supplement the budgetary revenues of the Federation, it is obvious that the first reflections come down to two ideas--how to avoid deficit financing and in general to bring budget expenditure into line with capabilities?

Let us look at the breakdown of budget expenditures:

(in percentage)

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Financing the Yugoslav People's Army	40.3	41.8	42.7	45.6
Supplemental funds to the underdeveloped republics and Kosovo	6.6	6.9	8.1	8.6
Welfare of disabled veterans (military pensions)	14.6	16.1	15.1	14.9
Promotion of foreign trade	23.8	19.4	20.8	20.2
Personal incomes in federal bodies and agencies	3.8	6.1	6.3	6.0
Noneconomic investments	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.4
Obligations from past years	5.0	4.5	4.0	2.3

The very fact that 1 dinar in 10 of the social product created annually goes into the budget represents a serious reason for some serious talk about the federal budget. Otherwise any stabilization program will be incomplete or almost unrealizable.

7045

CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFS

ACCUSED OF WAR CRIMES--The district court in Sarajevo issued a decision to investigate three persons on suspicion of war crimes committed against the civilian population during World War II, as based on Article 142 of the SFRY Constitution. Investigations have opened against Ibra Mehovic, born in 1912 in the village of Otricevo in Rogatica Opstina, Jakub Smajilovic, born 1921 in the village of Kukavice in Rogatica Opstina, and Dusan Koponja born in 1921 in the village of Gravljiva Njiva in Vogosca Opstina. [Excerpt] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Aug 80 p 14]

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